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I. Introduction
Statistics show that violence against women in the family is one
of the most common forms of violence as well as the most common
cause of physical injuries to women.' Europe is not an exception. In
France women comprise 95% of the victims of reported violence. Of
these, 51% were assaulted by their husbands. In the Forensic
Hospital in Bucharest, Romania, 28% of the women seeking
treatment had been beaten by an intimate male partner. Judges
estimate that 60% of the divorce cases in Bucharest involve claims of
physical violence.
A few examples from European countries show the insufficiency
of legal protection for women from violence in their homes. From
data available in the 1990s,3 only in Austria is there a protection order
available in cases of domestic violence. Not a single European
country has a specific criminal provision on domestic violence.
However, special provisions on marital rape were incorporated into
the legal systems of Austria, Cyprus, Norway and the United
Kingdom.4 Only Austria, Germany, Cyprus and Norway had specific
procedural protections for victims.
1. According to Julie Mertus, Nancy Flowers and Mallika Dutt:
Battering is the greatest single cause of injury among US women, accounting
for more emergency room visits (over one million per year) than auto
accidents, muggings and rape combined. In Papua New Guinea, 67% of
rural women and 56% of urban women have been victims of domestic
violence. A three-month surveillance survey in Alexandria, Egypt, indicated
that domestic violence was the leading cause of injury to women, accounting
for 27.9% of all visits by women to trauma units. A random sample of 150
women in Trondheim, Norway, found that 25% had been physically or
sexually abused by their male partners. In Canada, 62% of women murdered
died at the hands of an intimate partner.
JULIE MERTUS, NANCY FLOWERS & MALLIKA DuTr, LOCAL ACrION GLOBAL

CHANGE 90 (United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)) & Center
for Women's Global Leadership 1999).

2. See generally Radika Kumaraswamy, U.N. GAOR Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
Kumaraswamy is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women.

3. See id.
4. In Croatia, it was included in a revised Criminal Code in November, 1997.
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Domestic violence has been omnipresent for centuries, and yet,
until recently, women were generally not able to seek any protection
from the law, either before domestic courts or at the international
level. Moreover, it was unthinkable until the emergence of human
rights instruments in the second part of this century that an individual
might ever claim a violation of her or his rights of any kind before an
international judicial or quasi-judicial body.
However, the
development of concepts in international law such as the individual
right to petition, the positive obligations of states, the absolute
character of certain rights, and the expansion of the application of
state responsibility for the acts of private individuals, all provide
fertile ground for the recognition of domestic violence as a human
rights issue.
Simultaneously with such developments, the global women's
movement has concentrated on, among other gender-related issues,
the "recognition of domestic violence as widespread and largely
unprosecuted and the understanding that the systematic,
discriminatory nonprosecution of domestic violence constitutes a
violation of the right to equal protection under international law."'
The idea of regarding incidents of domestic violence as a form of
torture has long been around. While some fiercely oppose the idea
that suffering inflicted in the private sphere, without the direct
involvement of state officials and without being for the restricted list
of purposes, might ever be seen as torture,6 feminists have argued
about the artificiality of the private/public distinction.7 Feminist
5. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human

Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1120 (1995).
6. See generally EDWARD PETERS, TORTU E (1996).
7. See, e.g., Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the
Public/PrivateDistinctionin InternationalHuman Rights Law, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.

87 (1993). According to Romany,
Susan Okin provides a useful framework for the critique of the
public/private division of spheres within human rights law. As she explains,

the public/private dichotomy, by ignoring the political character of power
unequally distributed in family life, obscures the political nature of so-called
private life. The dichotomy clouds the fact that the domestic arena is itself
created by the political realm where the state reserves the right to intervene.
The dichotomy hides the area in which ourselves become gendered. Finally,
the dichotomy obscures the psychological and practical barriers that the

social division of labor imposes upon women. Similarities between the
structural components of the family and the state illustrate the arbitrariness
inherent in the demarcation of social spheres. The blurring of institutional
lines between the family and the state is less pronounced than those between
the market and the family. Both the family and the state are units of
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scholars divide into those who tend to incorporate the incidents of

domestic violence into already recognized forms of ill-treatment,
including torture,8 and those who stress the parallels between

domestic violence cases and officially inflicted torture, while still
recognizing the differences of the two and pointing out that drawing

similarities between domestic violence cases and officially inflicted
torture contributes to the recognition of domestic violence as a

serious human rights abuse.9
This Article argues that as far as the European human rights
enforcement bodies are concerned, the incidents of domestic violence
do satisfy the criteria imposed by the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights"° and the European Commission of Human Rights"
necessary to qualify various forms of ill-treatment as prohibited by
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 2 In this
respect, the question arises whether the European Convention may
be used by women" of European countries as a tool of protection
against abuse that occurs within their homes and as a catalyst for
changes in legislation and practices pertinent to domestic violence
cases. In other words, the present concern is how likely it would be
that the European Court, if presented by an alleged violation of
Article 3 in the context of domestic violence, would accept those
government within which actors play fiduciary roles, while the market is
deemed pre-political. Both the family and the state lack the relative
freedom from rules which the market enjoys since family and state decisions
are informed by "overarching ideals." Both the family and the state share
similar discourses whereby political philosophy refers to family ideals while
family theorists allude to political ideals, sharing an arsenal of linguistic
imagery of the market as a cornerstone of consent.
Id. at 110.
8. See, e.g., DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990), ELISABETH
PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY (1987).
9. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in Everyday Life:
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 291 (1994), Romany,
supra note 7.
10. The terms "the Court" or "the European Court" will be used in this article to
refer to the European Court of Human Rights.
11. The term "the Commission" will be used in this article to refer to the
European Commission of Human Rights.
12. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953,213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter European Convention].
13. As Rhonda Copelon has pointed out, "Domestic violence is not genderneutral. While in heterosexual relationships women sometimes fight back and in
exceptional cases kill or injure their partners, severe, repeated domestic violence is
overwhelmingly initiated by men and inflicted upon women." Copelon, supra note 9,
at 303.
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allegations and provide women with a means of protection in an
international human rights forum against intimate violence.
The approach in this Article is to establish the elements of the
forms of ill-treatment prohibited by the European Convention in
Article 3 through an analysis of the Court's and the Commission's
cases. In Parts II through VI, the elements of torture, inhuman
treatment, degrading treatment, inhuman punishment, and degrading
punishment, respectively, are discerned and applied to the incidents
of domestic violence. Part VII discusses yet another significant aspect
of the Court's decision-making process: the interpretation of the
Convention.
Like most other human rights instruments, the
European Convention does not define the content or the scope of the
protection offered by each article, thus opening the possibility for
various interpretations of its provisions. A brief historic overview of
the Court's decisions regarding Article 3, as well as certain other
provisions of the Convention, provides a basis to anticipate with more
certainty the possible outcome of a human rights claim before the
Court in the future.
H. Torture: Definition and Application to the
Incidents of Domestic Violence
A. Arriving at the Definition
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms does not give the definition of either torture or any other
form of ill-treatment covered by Article 3. The text of Article 3 of
the Convention only refers to the prohibited acts as follows: "No one
shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment., 14 It has therefore been left to the enforcement bodies
of the Convention to categorize the various treatments prohibited by
Article 3 on a case-by-case basis.
In the case of Irelandv. United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights stated that
ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall
within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in
the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of
14. European Convention, art. 3.
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the victim, etc."5

The minimum level of severity requirement applies to all forms of illtreatment under Article 3.

In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the

landmark case relating to Article 3 of the Convention, the Irish
government alleged that some practices against Irish Republican

Army (IRA) suspects amounted to torture. 6 The background of this
case was the long-lasting crisis in Northern Ireland, including the fact

that by the middle of 1971, the campaign of violence carried out by
the IRA had attained unprecedented proportions. 7 The Northern

Ireland government, in an attempt to prevent ongoing terrorism in
Northern Ireland, introduced extra-judicial measures of detention
and internment of suspected terrorists. From August 9, 1971, until

November 7, 1972, when certain of the Special Powers Regulations
were replaced, the authorities in Northern Ireland exercised four such
extra-judicial powers: arrest for interrogation purposes during fortyeight hour periods; arrest and remand to custody; detention of an
arrested person; and internment." After establishing the facts of the

case, a majority of the Court arrived at the decision that the treatment
against IRA suspects in some cases amounted to inhuman treatment,
in some cases to degrading treatment, and in some cases to both.
The European Commission of Human Rights was of the opinion
that the conditions of detention and the occurrence of treatment
known as "the five techniques"' 9 allegedly applied against IRA
suspects by the British authorities in five separate places constituted
15. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 65, Jan. 18, 1978.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. The treatment known as "the five techniques" consisted of the following:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours
in a "stress position," described by those who underwent it as being
"spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head
against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to
stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly on the fingers;"
(b) hooding: putting a black or navy colored bag over the detainees' heads
and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during
interrogation;
(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in
a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise;
(d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the
detainees of sleep;
(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet
during their stay at the centre and pending interrogations.
Id. at 41.
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torture. The Commission attempted to define torture in relation to
inhuman treatment, stating that inhuman treatment is that which
deliberately causes severe mental or physical suffering, while torture
is an aggravated form of inhuman treatment. This definition of
torture in essence does not differ from the one given by the Court in
the same case: torture is deliberate inhuman treatment causing very
serious and cruel suffering.
The Court explained that the practice of the five techniques
represented inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention. The Court did not further explain what specific
elements of the treatment satisfied the requirements of inhuman
treatment. However, the Court explained why the treatment in this
case did not amount to torture:
In order to determine whether the five techniques should also be
qualified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction,
embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or
degrading treatment. In the Court's view, this distinction derives
principally from differences in the intensity of the suffering
inflicted.
The Court considers in fact that, whilst there exists on the one
hand violence which is to be condemned both on moral grounds
and also in most cases under the domestic law of the Contracting
States but which does not fall within Article 3 of the Convention, it
appears on the other hand that it was the intention that the
Convention, with its distinction between "torture" and "inhuman
or degrading treatment," should by the first of these terms attach a
special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious
and cruel suffering.
Moreover, this seems to be the thinking lying behind Article I in
...Resolution 3452... adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 9 December 1975, which declares: "Torture
constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination,
undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment,
although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming
of others and/or information and although they were used
systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular
intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so
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understood. 20

Both the Court and the Commission concentrate on the effects of
the treatment applied-the intensity of the suffering. The difference
between torture and inhuman treatment is, according to both the
Court and the Commission, one of degree. However, a definition
where the only criteria to distinguish between the various forms of illtreatment are severity of suffering does not contribute much to the
clarity of the definition or the predictability of the outcome of cases.
In this case, it seems that the only difference between the Court's
judgment and the Commission's decision was the fact that more
commissioners than judges deemed the level of suffering experienced
by the victims of the five techniques as serious enough to constitute
torture.
Four judges did not agree with the Court's opinion that the five
techniques did not constitute torture. Judge Zekia, in his dissenting
opinion, stated that torture is "an aggravated form of inhuman
treatment causing intense physical and/or mental suffering."'" While
this part of his opinion does not differ from either the Court's or the
Commission's definitions of torture, Judge Zekia further argued that
the degree of intensity and the length of such suffering were not the
only considerations:
[T]he nature of ill-treatment inflicted, the means and methods
employed, the repetition and duration of such treatment, the age,

sex and health condition of the person exposed and whether the
injuries inflicted caused serious consequences for short or long

duration are all relevant matters to be considered together and
arrive at a conclusion whether torture has been committed.2
This part of his opinion is in accordance with the Court's view that
when deliberating upon whether a treatment in question amounts to
torture or not, all the circumstances of the case have to be taken into
consideration. Judge Zekia went on to give several examples of what
should, in his eyes, be seen as torture:
[I]f a mother, for interrogation, is separated from her suckling baby
by keeping them apart in adjoining rooms and the baby, on account
of hunger, starts yelling for hours within the hearing of the mother
and she is not allowed to attend to her baby, again I should say
both the mother and the baby have been subjected to inhuman
20. Id. at 66-67.
21. Id. at 97 (Zekia, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (Zekia, J., dissenting).
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treatment, the mother by being agonized and the baby by being

deprived of the urgent attention of the mother. Neither the mother
nor the child has been assaulted. 2'
Judge Zekia did not agree with the majority's opinion because he
deemed the five techniques to be a treatment of such severity and
applied in such circumstances as to bring it beyond the level of
inhuman treatment to the level of torture.
Judge O'Donoghue, in opining that the five techniques
amounted to torture, expressed the view that "in the present-day
world there can be little doubt that torture may be inflicted in the
mental sphere." 24 By this remark, he stressed that intense physical
suffering is not a necessary element of torture, and that suffering in
only the mental sphere could suffice to constitute torture.
Judge Matscher, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the
majority's view that torture was characterized by a physical or
psychological suffering of a certain severity. But he regarded the
element of intensity "as complementary to the systematic element:
the more sophisticated and refined method, the less acute will be the
pain....

The modem methods of torture, which in their outward

aspects differ markedly from the primitive, brutal methods employed
in former times, are well known."' Therefore, in this view, the
element that prevailed in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom was
the systematic application of the treatment of the five techniques.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice dissented from the majority's opinion and
disagreed with the opinions of the other dissenters in addressing the
issue of the five techniques. He alone stated that the five techniques
did not amount to either torture or inhuman treatment. In his
opinion, the treatment in question belonged to the class of treatment
that would have to be condemned by the domestic laws of European
countries, for it was not of such a severity as to be covered by the
protection of an international human rights instrument.
His
argument was that the Convention was drafted at the point in history
when Europe was just recovering from the atrocities of the Second
World War and that the drafters, when deliberating upon Article 3 of
the Convention, primarily had in mind the prevention of the practices
that occurred in concentration camps of Nazi Germany or against
prisoners of war. Less severe treatments were to be protected solely
23. Id. at 97-98 (Zekia, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 106 (O'Donoghue, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 139 (Matscher, J., dissenting).
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by means of domestic laws. He saw the function of an international
human rights instrument as one that should be invoked only when a
major, gross violation of human rights was in question. He
distinguished between
categories of torture or of what is inhuman-categories which, both
of them, imply treatment reaching a serious, even an extreme
degree of cruelty, barbarity or severity, [from] something which,
though to be condemned, is in comparison mild.... The fact that
the Convention made no provision against lesser forms of illtreatment than such as would amount to torture, or fall into the
category of the inhuman, [shows] that these lesser forms were not
intended to be covered. 26
What is to be further observed in his opinion is that he, like the Court
and the Commission, stressed the importance of the severity of
suffering involved. But again, such concentration on that one
element proves to be highly unreliable and subjective. While the
majority of the commissioners saw the treatment in question as
torture, and the majority of the judges saw it as inhuman or
degrading, Judge Fitzmaurice concluded that it was not covered at all
by Article 3 of the Convention, but remained in the realm of less
severe violations that were to be protected only by domestic law.
All these opinions agree on one point: for treatment to amount
to torture, it has to include a severe and intense form of suffering.
From all the expressed views on the definition of torture, some
common elements may be discerned: torture is a treatment that (1) is
inhuman; (2) is deliberately inflicted; and (3) causes suffering that is
very serious and cruel (in the Court's language) or severe (in the
Commission's language). The suffering can be physical or mental.
B. The Elements of Torture
1.

Inhuman Treatment

The Court has not defined inhuman, nor has it clarified what
specific elements of a particular treatment make it fall into this
category. In this Article, the word "inhuman" will be used to mean
treatment that has a dehumanizing effect on its victim. The effect is
that it destroys human dignity and adversely affects the psychological
well-being of a person: "It is not primarily the victim's information,

26. Id. at 106-07 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
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but the victim, that torture needs to win-or reduce to
"Torture tends to the disintegration and
powerlessness." 27
consequent annihilation of the psychic and moral personality, to the
non-physical destruction, practically speaking, of the human person,
with long lasting results." '
In the domestic violence context, inhuman treatment is a process
in which one partner, by means of dominance and control, imposes
upon the other a picture of himself or herself as an object, a
dehumanized thing. In this process, a man intimidates a woman by
using coercion and threats to make her obey and comply with his
demands. Some men justify violence as a means of disciplining their
women or changing their behavior or way of thinking, acting or living.
Through violence, they seek to impose on women their picture of the
right role for women, their right place in life. Such a view represents
another aspect of the degradation of women-seeing women as less
than adults, as incapable of deciding things for themselves or making
their own choices. In a context of violence, there is no space for
equality, negotiation, discussion, or compromise. Outbursts of
violence occur without predictable reason and therefore keep women
in constant fear and anguish. 29
Violent episodes are usually followed by loving and contriving
phases, where the abuser appears extremely kind and regretful of his
violent deeds. Rhonda Copelon has observed that "the alternation of
active and passive brutality with kindness is one of the most effective
means to undermine the prisoner's . . .hatred of the torturer and

convert the torturer into a savior."' Psychologists researching the
battered woman syndrome have stated that the process of battering
produces anxiety, depression and sleeplessness. Battered women may
experience extreme states of dependency, debility and dread, which
confine and break down their world.3' Domestic violence undermines
a woman's personality and self-esteem, numbing her feelings toward
herself and others, and allows the abuser to assert total control over
her life. A woman victim of severe physical, sexual and psychological
abuse by her husband stated, "'He really made me feel like a piece of
meat, like a receptacle. My husband had told me that all a girl was
27. PETERS, supra note 6, at 164.

28. Id. at 187 (citing the argument of Francesco Compagnoni).
29. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
30. Copelon, supra note 9, at 7.
31. See JUDITH LEWIs HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 90-91 (1992).
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was a servant who could not think ....
Feminists have argued that
[d]omestic violence against women is systemic and structural, a
mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is built upon male
superiority and female inferiority, sex-stereotyped roles and
expectations, and the economic, social and political predominance
of men and dependency of women. While the legal and cultural
embodiments of patriarchal thinking vary among different cultures,
there is an astounding convergence in regard to the basic tenets of
patriarchy and the legitimacy, if not necessity, of violence as a
mechanism of enforcing that system. Violence is encouraged and
perpetuates women's dependence and her dehumanization as
"other," a servant and a form of property. It is also necessary to
preserve overbearing male entitlement and unbearable female
constraint. The imperfection of-or inevitable tension in-the
system is reflected in the ever-present potential and fact that
women will defy this destiny. Jealousy is a common theme in
violent scenarios. Women are to be feared because they are
sexually voracious, tricksters, sorcerers and lesbians. Women's
capacity and power-exhibited through pregnancy, mothering,
beauty, or offer of intimacy, through competence at wage-earning
work, social relations or household management, or through
"rebellions," small or large-trigger attack. Through violence, men
seek both to deny and destroy the power of women. Through
violence, men seek and confirm the devaluation and
dehumanization of women. 3
2. DeliberatelyInflicted Torture
This requirement relates to the state of mind of a batterer, or, in
other words, to the level of his culpability. "Deliberately" in this
context has the same meaning as "intentionally." To act intentionally
is to act purposely or knowingly. "A defendant acts purposefully
when he acts with the conscious objective of causing a particular
result."' The Model Penal Code defines acting purposely and acting
knowingly as follows:
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
32. WALKER, supra note 29, at Prologue (quoting an anonymous victim).
33. Copelon, supra note 9, at 5.
34.

(1994).

STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

209
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offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or
hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.35

Most of the men who use violence against their female intimate
partners act with the purpose of bringing about a desired state of
affairs.3 Lenore Walker, after many years of research on battered
wives, concluded that a batterer acts "in order to coerce [the victim]
to do something he wants her to do."'37 They act with intent to inflict
severe pain and suffering and they plan their attacks. 8 Wife beating
35. MODELPENAL CODE § 2.02.

36. See Copelon, supra note 9, at 12.
37. WALKER, supra note 29, at xv.
38. The following is an example of the intentional character of the abusive acts of
wife abusers:
Melanie came across a file card that sickened her. On it her husband had
written a list of dates corresponding to the forced-sex episodes of the
previous few months. Next to each date was a code. "As close as I could
figure it, he had graded each rape on some sort of zero-to-ten ranking,
depending, I guess on how good it was." There were other numbers and
letters which she suspects indicated the types of acts he committed. "The
card totally stunned me. And it opened my eyes to the fact that he wasn't
going to change." She had thought that his attacks had been spontaneous,
but it became clear that his behavior was calculated. She was not sure
whether he had planned the attacks beforehand or just evaluated them
afterward, but she knew that his attitude toward the rapes was much more
rational than she ever suspected.
DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SExuAL ABUSE OF WIVES 53
(Free Press 1987) (1985).
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almost never occurs in a public place or in front of witnesses who
might interfere. It occurs in private, when no one is present, or
sometimes in the presence of family members who are too young or
too old, or just too frightened themselves, to intervene, or are
otherwise unable to prevent the battering. Despite showing violent
behavior toward their wives, most batterers are entirely capable of
maintaining perfect self-control in other social relations.
a. The Heat of PassionDefense
The heat of passion defense may be described as the
commitment of an offense while the offender is under the influence of
an extreme emotional disturbance." Often there is an additional
requirement that there be a reasonable explanation or excuse for such
disturbance. Such conduct may be described as impulsive, the result
of provocation or a loss of control.
The heat of passion defense is often evoked by wife abusers as
they claim that they were provoked by something their wives did or
said, or did not say or do, or the way they looked, were dressed or
behaved. However, women's stories reveal that such claims are often
unjustifiable, as any possible reason may satisfy an abuser as a motive
for violence. "In in-depth interviews with eighteen batterers involved
in a counseling program, which examined their excuses and
justifications, forty-four percent said they reacted to a wife's verbal
aggressiveness/nagging, while seventy-eight percent gave justifications
based on her failure to fulfill the obligations of a good wife. These
failures ranged from serving fatty foods to refusing sex. ' 4°
Another common characteristic of wife abusers is the complete
arbitrariness in their judgments about what is wrong with their wife's
behavior. Their acts are unpredictable, and violence may erupt at any
moment, for any reason. Often, there need not be any reason.
Lenore Walker has noted, "In my research, I have attempted to look
at battered women as victims of battering behavior rather than as the
causes of the violence. Although these women often did or said
things to make the batterers
angry, it was obvious that he would have
41
beaten her anyway.,

39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3.
40. Copeloln, supra note 9, at 335-36.
41. WALKER, supra note 29, at 14.
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b. Intention in the Context of Alcohol or DrugAbuse
In the criminal law there are three contexts in which acting under
the influence of alcohol or drugs may be seen as intentional. The first
and most obvious situation is when a batterer plans the battering
before becoming drunk, and then consumes alcohol and begins
battering. In this situation, his act is purposeful. He becomes drunk
as part of the plan to beat his wife. Drunkenness is simply a device to
help him fulfill his criminal plans.
In the second situation, although the batterer does not plan the
battering, it just so happens that each time he becomes drunk, he
beats his wife and claims to have no control over his behavior. He is
aware that when becomes drunk, he is likely to beat his wife. Here,
he is acting knowingly, and acting knowingly is one of the forms of
intentional behavior.
The third situation is when someone is aware that being drunk
makes him extremely likely to beat his wife; he is acting purposely at
all times. In this context, becoming drunk is just a way to ease
whatever inhibitions he might have against a violent outburst. In this
case the batterer is acting purposely.
c.

The Insanity Defense

It may indeed be true that some batterers are insane. The
insanity defense
requires a defendant to have had a severe mental illness, defect or
disorder at the time of the alleged criminal acts. Further, this
condition must have impaired the defendant's mental capacity to
such an extent that either (s)he did not understand the nature and
consequences of what (s)he was doing or did not understand that
what (s)he was doing was wrong. 12
Batterers who can use this defense cannot be held criminally liable
and criminal sanctions cannot be applied against them. Nevertheless,
there are other measures to which they might be subjected.'
3. Suffering
The element of suffering is apparent in the various definitions of
42. Audrey E. Stone, PresentingBattered Women's Expert Testimony: Trial and
Error,271 PLI/EsT. 255,292 (1998).
43. The nature and duration of such measures would depend on the nature of the
illness as well as the level of dangerousness of such individuals. However, this sphere
is not the relevant issue for this thesis.
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domestic violence. Lenore Walker offers one such definition:
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern
for her rights.... Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. 44
Similarly, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women defines gender-based violence as "violence that is
directed against a woman because she is a woman or which affects
women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical,
mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and
other deprivations of liberty. 4'
Finally, the United Nations'
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines
violence against women to include
"physical, sexual and psychological
46
violence occurring in the family.
In the context of domestic violence, some form of physical
brutality is usually present. Acts such as "beating with hands or
objects, biting, spitting, punching, kicking, stabbing, strangling,
scalding, burning, and attempted drowning,"'47 as well as forced sex
with the batterer or others, obviously result in physical and mental
pain and suffering. As to the psychological element of suffering,
Audrey E. Stone has observed,
An extensive and continually expanding research literature
supports the assertion that domestic violence is associated with a
wide range of traumatic psychological reactions.... Trauma theory
explains the psychological and physical impact of traumatic
experiences, including violence, on victims. Research on a wide
variety of both acute and chronic trauma has established that
exposure to serious traumatic events can lead to exceptional mental
states both during and following the trauma.... Such altered
mental states during trauma exposure can include flashbacks and
other forms of re-experiencing the trauma, a generalized flattening
of affect to avoid overwhelming emotions associated with the

44.

WALKER,

supra note 29, at xv.

45. U.N. GAOR Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
46. G.A. Res. 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49

(1993).
47. Copelon, supra note 9, at 311.
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trauma, and pathological feelings of shame or guilt.4

a. The Physicaland PsychologicalComponents of Suffering
Lenore Walker writes the following:
While it was perfectly evident that women suffering physical
mutilation were battered, some women reported incidents which

did not produce physical damage.
... I could not, however, ignore the pleas of battered women
who insisted that psychological abuse was often more harmful than
the physical.... I found that both forms of violence exist in
battering couples and they cannot be separated .... To measure
psychological abuse, the severity must be estimated with both the
frequency with which it occurs and the subjective impact it has
upon the woman. Most of the women in this project describe

incidents involving psychological humiliation and verbal
harassment as their worst battering experiences, whether or not
they had been physically abused.
Following is a comparison between some of the cases in which
European human rights bodies have found treatment that amounted
to torture, and incidents of domestic violence that involved similar
treatment. These cases are neither the most violent, nor do they
include the most severe consequences or injuries, but they show the
astonishing similarities of treatment received by victims of officially
inflicted torture and victims of spousal abuse.
In the case of Aksoy v. Turkey, the Commission found that the
applicant was subjected to ill-treatment by Turkish police. The
applicant was "strung up by the arms. This caused injury for which he
subsequently received medical treatment. The ill-treatment of the
applicant was of such a serious nature that it should be deemed
torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention."5 Zeki
Aksoy51 was kept in police custody for at least fourteen days, and the

treatment that was deemed torture was alleged to have lasted for
"four days, the first two being very intensive. He allegedly lost the
48. Stone, supra note 42, at 300.
49. WALKER, supra note 29, at xiv-xv.
50. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, Oct. 23, 1995 (Commission report),
reprinted in Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1997) (accepting findings of
Commission report).
51. Zeki Aksoy was shot and killed on April 16, 1994, allegedly as a result
applying to the Commission. See id.
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movements of his arms and hands as a result. 52
The story of Lorraine is as follows:
The night my arm was so badly damaged, Dick and I had a
horrible fight.... He choked me to the point I knew I was going
unconscious.... He reached out and grabbed my right arm and
twisted it behind my back to the point where my hand was clear up
between my shoulder blades, almost up to my neck. There were a
lot of other blows that night, on the shoulder and the back and
around my head.
He used an open hand or the side of his hand, like a karate-type
thing. I didn't even realize that my arm was injured that bad until I
went to the doctor a couple of days afterward and had him count
my bruises.... I began to have trouble with real severe backaches
and then my arm just wouldn't work. My hand muscles wouldn't
work ....My arm would be just horribly tired and I couldn't move
it anymore.... I finally had to have surgery. It was thirteen
months after it happened that I was finally taken off disability.53
There are certain similarities between the treatments of Aksoy
and Lorraine. While the treatment against Aksoy consisted of being
strung up by the arms for prolonged periods of time during fourteen
days, Lorraine was seriously attacked for a period of a couple of
hours during a single night. However, her story revealed that the
described event was just one of many similar events during her
marriage.'
Both Aksoy and Lorraine suffered the same
consequences: loss of the movement of the arms. It can be argued
that Aksoy's torturers were trained in applying the treatment known
as "Palestinian hanging," and that it was designed to disable the
victim, while Lorraine's husband was not a person trained to inflict
violence that would selectively attack certain bodily functions. Still,
the level of suffering and injury caused to Aksoy and Lorraine are
comparable as they both were left without movement of the arms.
In another case against Turkey, the Commission found that
Ahmet Cakici had been subjected to torture that included "beatings
and electric shocks and an injury to his head and ribs."55 Although
women in the cases of domestic violence are not exposed to electro-

52. Id.
53. WALKER, supra note 29, at 89-90.

54. See id. at 88.
55. Cakici v. Turkey, No. 23657/94, Mar. 12, 1998, para. 259 (Commission
report).
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shocks, they often undergo treatment similar to that of Cakici.
Bernardette Powell's case represents abuse that parallels the violence
inflicted on Cakici:
[Hler husband had crushed burning cigarettes into her body, kicked
her down the stairs, beat her with a metal ring closed in his fist,
forced her to have cold and hot water showers and attempted to
assault her with a linoleum knife.... [T]his violence, in one form
or another, occurred on an average of twice a week. 56
Both Cakici and Powell received beatings to various parts of
their bodies. Cakici was exposed to electroshock, and while there is
no comparable treatment in Powell's story, one may still imagine that
the level of pain inflicted by electroshock is comparable to the level of
pain caused by burning cigarettes. In these two cases, the main point
of comparison is the level of pain.
b.

Rape

In the case of Aydin v. Turkey, the applicant was
detained for three days. She was blindfolded. She was tortured to
make her give information about the hiding places of terrorists.
She was hit by fists, kicked in the eyes, arms and legs. They took
off her clothes and on separate occasions she was raped three
times.... The applicant was taken to a torture chamber. She was
stripped naked and forced into two car wheels, which were spun
round. She was also beaten and sprayed with pressurized cold
water.57
The Commission referred to the circumstances of the treatment as
follows:
[Tihe applicant was aged approximately seventeen when she was
taken into custody by the security forces. She was isolated from the
other members of her family and blindfolded. She was in the
circumstances in a highly vulnerable situation. The deliberate ill
treatment inflicted on her by beating and being placed in a tire and
hosed with pressurized water, combined with the humiliation of
being stripped naked, falls clearly within the scope of the
prohibition contained in Article 3. Rape committed by an official
or person in authority on a detained person must in addition be
regarded as treatment or punishment of an especially severe
56. RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 274.
57. Aydin v. Turkey, No. 23178/94, Mar. 7 1996, paras. 61, 64 (Commission

report).
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kind.... The nature of such an act (rape) which strikes at the heart

of the victim's physical and moral integrity, must be characterized
as particularly cruel and involving acute physical and psychological
suffering. This is aggravated when committed by a person in
authority over the victim. Having regard therefore to the extreme
vulnerability of the applicant and the deliberate infliction on her of

serious and cruel ill-treatment in a coercive and punitive context,
the Commission finds that such ill treatment must be regarded as
torture ....
58
The comparison of Aydin's case with the story of a woman
named Anne, as reported in Lenore Walker's The Battered Woman,
reveals many the similarities between the two situations. Anne
married at the age of eighteen and in marriage she was subjected to
serious abuse by her husband over a period of several years. She
described some of the treatment that she received in the following
words: "He grabbed me, stuck me in the shower, and started dousing
me with cold water.... He would sometimes drag me out on the flat

roof on a cold night to make love, while I cried and kept saying no."'5 9
In addition, Anne was often beaten by her husband.
Anne's treatment remarkably resembles the treatment Sukran
Aydin received in police custody. Both of them were raped, severely
beaten, and exposed to unwanted showers of water. They were of
approximately the same age at the time, Aydin seventeen and Anne
eighteen.
Yet there were also certain differences. One of the elements
often stressed as a dividing line between officially inflicted torture
and domestic violence is the fact that victims of officially inflicted
torture are kept in custody, unable to escape, while women victims of
domestic violence are free to leave any time. However, psychologists
who have been working with battered women stress that those
women do not feel free to leave because they have been often
exposed to serious threats to their own lives, or the lives of close
relatives or friends if they leave. Additionally, abusers keep their
victims in entire economic dependency, making the chances of their
leaving even lower.'
58. Id. at para. 189.
59. WALKER, supra note 29, at 4-5.
60. Diana Russell describes many other cases where battered women were
prevented from leaving their abusive husbands or were persecuted after they left:
The experiences of these women illustrate the extraordinary lengths
some women have to go to get away from abusive husbands, and the
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Battered women often find themselves trapped in their homes,
isolated from friends and relatives, under constant threats,
economically deprived, with no place to escape. Some men lock up
their wives for prolonged periods of time while they inflict various
forms of violence upon them.6 ' According to Radika Kumaraswamy,
A battered woman's fear of precipitat[ing] deadly violence against
herself or her children may make escape dangerous: the lack of
resources, legal and community support, or alternative means to
survive may make escape seem impossible as well as reinforce her
shame, hopelessness, and sense that she deserves this treatment.62
The battered woman thus is seemingly not free to leave, making her
similar to a prisoner. 6
Another point of comparison reflects on the person of the
perpetrator. In Aydin's case, the Commission stated that
rape in custody committed by a person clothed in the authority of
the State where the victim is in a position of isolation and
dependency, had a particularly serious stigma attached, not least as
a result of the long term and serious mental and psychological
64
trauma and damage that may be caused by such treatment.
In domestic violence cases, by comparison, the aggravating
enormous sacrifices they sometimes have to make; these are likely major
reasons why some women stay with abusive husbands. As Ann Jones
pointed out, it is a fact that has rarely been explored. Mrs. Ashmore was
kidnapped three times by her husband after they were already separated.
He followed her to another state even after their divorce. According to Mrs.
Ashmore, the police even said that it was fine if she killed him, since there
was nothing they could do to protect her.
Mrs. Clayton's husband tried to murder her several times. She claimed
that the police concurred in this conclusion, but said they could not protect
her, and advised her to leave the state, which she did. Fortunately for Mrs.
Clayton, her husband died a year later.
Mrs. Freeman left her husband, but a bartender, her landlord, her doctor,
all cooperated with her husband's effort to find her again and/or to make it
difficult for her to leave him.
Finally, Mrs. Goddard had to leave her home, her family, a good job, her
friends, and move to another state because she believed her husband's threat
to kill her was serious. She is still living in extreme fear for her life.
Leaving husbands who view their wives as their property can mean
risking death, and some who take this risk are killed.
RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 233.

61. Diana Russell reports the story of Mrs. Jones, whose husband had kept her
locked in the apartment for five weeks, raping her repeatedly. See id. at 148.
62. Kumaraswamy, supra note 2.
63. Her fear may be as strong as physical confinement.
64. Aydin v. Turkey at para. 183.
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nature of sexual assaults arises precisely from the intimate nature of
the relationship between victim and abuser, where violence breaks
trust, intimacy and closeness forever. That it occurs in a private
sphere, namely the home, makes it no less severe. On the contrary, it
shatters a woman's picture of the world and her beliefs and
expectations of home as a place of safety, kinship and protection.6
Battered women also suffer from long-term serious mental
trauma and damage. David Finkelhor and Kersti Ybo have reported
that the victims of spousal rape to whom they talked experienced, in
addition to the immediate trauma, serious long-term effects. This
sometimes continued even for many years after divorcing their
husbands. They talked about "an inability to trust, lingering fear and
emotional pain[,] ... terrifying flashbacks and nightmares[,] ...
apprehensions about men and sexual dysfunction-problems that
kept them from having a social life or that interfered with subsequent
marriages."
Similarly, Diana Russell reports that the effects of marital rape
on women include suicide and attempted suicide, feelings of anxiety,
fear, general mistrust, depression, increased anger, and a desire to
hurt.67 Victims refer to the effects of spousal rape as worse than just
being beaten. Often they feel that it is a final humiliation, that they
are worthless, and that they are in existence simply to be used, as
evidenced by certain victims' reports of the boasting of their abusers.6
Diana Russell stresses the parallels between domestic violence
and officially inflicted torture with respect to the level of severity of
the suffering: "A man's home may be his castle, but for his wife, it is
sometimes a prison. The tactics some abusive husbands use to make
their wives comply with them are equivalent to torture, as cruel and
destructive of the will as the treatment received by prisoners of
65. Rhonda Copelon writes,
[T]he betrayal and shock of being beaten by a partner can be more numbing
and world-destroying than being beaten by a jailor. Rape by a husband may
be experienced as more devastating and the psychological harms may last
longer than when rape is perpetrated by a stranger. Resistance to emotional
dependency and the deepest level of trauma is more complicated for the
battered woman than for the hostage, as she is courted rather than
kidnapped into violence. She must... "unlearn love and trust, hope and
self-blame."
Copelon, supra note 9, at 349.
66. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 38, at 126.
67. See RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 190-205.
68. See generally DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE (1975).
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c. The Duration of the Treatment
Feminist researchers, mainly psychologists, who have been
working with battered women for many years have identified several
phases of a "cycle of violence." Lenore Walker writes about three
identifiable phases: the tension-building stage, the acute battering
incident, and the kindness and contrite loving behavior stage.' These
three phases continue in a cycle that lasts for many years. The actual
violence within the cycle may occur once in every few days or once in
several months, depending on the speed of the cycle. However, even
the phases that do not include physical violence are characterized by
other forms of violent behavior: threats, verbal abuse, controlling
devices, constant jealousy and dominance.
The duration of ill-treatment within the context of domestic
violence often exceeds the duration of ill-treatment in the context of
officially inflicted torture. For example, in the cases described in this
Part, Ahmet Cakici was held in custody for almost two and a half
years; Zeki Aksoy for fourteen to sixteen days; and Sukran Aydin for
three days. In all the cases of domestic violence cited in this Part, the
abuse continued for several years. Diana Russell writes about the
story of Dolores Churchill, who "describes the last seven years of her
marriage as a private hell of beatings, grotesque sexual abuse, rape,
threats with weapons and harassment administered by her husband."'
4. Purpose
It has long been argued that not every instance of deliberately
inflicted pain and suffering that in its severity might be seen as torture
satisfies the requirements to be torture as it is recognized by
international legal standards. Usually, two additional requirements
must be present. One such requirement is that the torture must be
inflicted by state officials; the other is that the torture must be
inflicted in pursuit of certain prohibited purposes. When the U.N.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment 7 was created in 1984, it reflected the view
69.
70.
71.
72.

RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 273.
See generally WALKER, supra note 29, at 55-77.
RUSSELL, supra note 8, at 276.
See discussion infra Part V.

73. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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described above on the criteria needed to deem a certain treatment
torture."
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides as follows:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(2) This article is without prejudice to any international instrument
or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of
wider application. 5
According to this definition, the necessary defining element of torture
is the set of special purposes in pursuit of which the torture is
inflicted. The range of prohibited purposes includes obtaining
information or a confession from the person subjected to the torture
or a third person; punishing the person subjected to the torture;
intimidating or coercing the person subjected to the torture or a third
person; and any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
As paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the CAT suggests, the definition
of torture found in paragraph 1 is not exclusive in respect to any other
international instrument which contains provisions of wider
application. There is significant room to argue that the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights has broadened the scope of
torture by omitting a requirement for specified purposes. For
example, in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Court, while
trying to discern between treatment that amounts to torture and that
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess.,
Annex, 93d plen. mtg., pt. 1, art. 1, 1, Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter CAT]. The CAT was entered into force on June 26, 1987. See 1987
U.N.Y.B. 755.
74. It is still uncertain whether all these requirements are necessary for the other
forms of ill-treatment covered by the CAT because the CAT gives only a definition
of torture and not of the other forms of ill-treatment. See CAT.
75. CAT, pt. 1, art. 1, TT 1-2.
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which constitutes inhuman treatment, stated the following:
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination,
undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment,
although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming
of others and/or information and although they were used
systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular
intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so
understood. 6

This statement, together with the definition of torture from the CAT,
might lead to the conclusion that to be classified as torture, a
treatment needs to be applied for the purpose of extracting a
confession, a naming of others, or information, or for some other
purpose that would satisfy the CAT requirement.
Such a conclusion, however, if applied to the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, would not be entirely correct.
Already, in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, two judges in their
dissenting opinions discussed the question of the purpose of torture.
It is important to observe that their dissents were not related to the
majority's view on purpose, but to the majority's view on what
constitutes torture in terms of severity of suffering and consequences
inflicted. It seems that the majority in that case did not give their
final or determining view on the issue of the purpose of torture. The
purpose issue was sporadically addressed, and even then only to
discern between torture and inhuman treatment regarding the
practice of the five techniques.
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice addressed the part of the
majority's opinion quoted above as follows:
If it is intended to indicate that the existence of such objectives is a
necessary ingredient before the treatment concerned can constitute
torture, such an idea must be firmly rejected. Torture is torture
whatever its object may be, or even if it has none, other than to
cause pain, provided it is inflicted by force ....
[T]he real question suggested by the references to the objectives
of the torture is whether there can ever be an objective justifying its
use.

77

Judge Matscher, while explaining his dissent from the opinion of
the majority of the Court and his concurrence with the unanimous
76. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 67, Jan. 18,1978.
77. Id. at 129-30 n.19 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
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Commission opinion that the practice of the five techniques did
constitute torture, also addressed the issue of the objectives of
torture:
[T]he distinguishing feature of the notion of torture is the
systematic, calculated (hence deliberate) and prolonged application
of treatment causing physical or psychological suffering of a certain
intensity, the aim of which may be to extort confessions, to obtain
information or simply to break a person's will in order to compel
him to do something he would not otherwise do, or again, to make
a person suffer for other reasons (sadism, aggravation of
punishment, etc.).78
From this opinion, there does not appear to be any single exhaustive
list of purposes of torture; rather, any reason may suffice if a certain
level of deliberately inflicted suffering is present.
However, it should be stressed that it is necessary that the torture
be deliberately inflicted; the infliction of pain or suffering that is only
accidental would not be deemed torture. Such a requirement has to
be distinguished from the specified purposes requirement. While
both refer to mens rea, the element of deliberation is connected with
the intentionality of the act as discussed above, and the specified
purposes requirement is a step further than the intentionality
requirement. The specified purposes requirement excludes from the
protection against torture all the acts that would otherwise satisfy the
remaining requirements of the definition of torture, but which are not
designed to obtain specified purposes.
5. Involvement of the State
The definition of torture in the CAT imposes an additional
requirement: it has to be inflicted "by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting
' 79
capacity.
official
in an
One might argue that in domestic violence cases, the
acquiescence of public officials is present since they do not perform
their duty to protect women from attacks in their homes.
Nevertheless, such a discussion is obviated by the argument here that
the involvement of state officials is not a requirement of the
European Convention, as determined by the decisions of the Court
and the Commission. What is required is the existence of a legal basis
78. Id. at 139 (Matscher, J., dissenting).

79. CAT, pt. 1, art. 1, 1 1.
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for the responsibility of the state.
There is no question about the existence of state responsibility,
under the human rights instruments, for violations of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by those instruments when the violation is
committed by organs of the state. That issue is not a concern of this
Article, however, because most acts of domestic violence are
perpetrated by private individuals, by and large in the private
sphere.'
Therefore, the focus of the present discussion is the
responsibility of the state for the acts of private individuals, as it can
be discerned from the European human rights bodies' jurisprudence.
81 Miss Y., a sixteen year
In the case of X. & Y. v. Netherlands,
old, mentally disabled girl, was raped in a privately-run home for
mentally handicapped children. The perpetrator was a son-in-law of
the directress, who lived on the premises of the institution but was not
employed there. The applicant claimed that there had been a
violation of Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. There was no
dispute as to the applicability of Article 8 because the facts
underlying the application concerned a matter of private life.'
During the proceedings, it was established that under the criminal law
provisions of the Netherlands, the applicant herself was excluded
from the list of persons legally able to bring up the charge of rape, as
was her father because the applicant was not placed under his
guardianship. The Court found a violation of Article 8 and based its
decision on the following grounds:
The Court recalls that although the object of Article 8 is essentially
that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by
the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in
an effective respect for private and family life . . . . These
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of
individuals between themselves. 3
It is crucial that the Court in this decision recognized the
responsibility of the state for the acts of private persons. The Court
80. While some men sometimes abuse their female partners in public spaces,
systematic, prolonged, repeated violence perpetrated by men against women in the

great majority of incidents occurs at home.
81. X. & Y. v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).

82. See id. at 11.
83. Id.
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stressed that the state did not only have a negative obligation to
abstain from the acts that may be an infringement of the rights
recognized by the Convention, but also had a positive obligation to
protect those rights for individuals when those rights are infringed by
the acts of other individuals acting solely in their individual private
capacity.
Although the applicant alleged that there had also been a
violation of Article 3 of the Convention, claiming that she suffered
inhuman and degrading treatment, the Court decided not to examine
the case under Article 3 because it had already found a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention. The Court's decision does not
necessarily support the view that there had not been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention for two reasons. First, it is common for
allegations of violations of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to come
together, and the Court always examines the violation of Article 8
first and usually decides not to examine the violation of Article 3 if it
finds a violation of Article 8. Also, when no violation under Article 8
is established, it is most likely that there would be no violation of
Article 3 eitherY
Second, if the Court had been of the opinion that Article 3 could
not have been applied to the acts of private individuals, it would have
been easy for the Court to have so decided, and, therefore, the Court
might not have abstained from giving such decision. It is important to
note that the concept of the positive obligation of the state and its
responsibility for the acts of private citizens is not restricted to the
application of Article 8 of the Convention, but is equally valid for the
application of Article 3.
Such a view is supported by the Court's judgment in the case of
A. v. United Kingdom.8' The applicant, a nine year-old boy was
forcefully beaten by his stepfather with a cane on more than one
occasion. After the Court simply stated that treatment of this kind
reached the level of severity prohibited by Article 3 of the
Convention," there still remained the issue of state responsibility for
the beating of the applicant by his stepfather. The Court arrived at
the following decision:
The Court considers that the obligation on the high contracting
84. See generally D. J. HARRIS
(1995).

ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS

85. A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 100/1997/884/1096, Sept. 23, 1998.
86. Id. at para. 21.
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parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone

within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take

measures designed to ensure that individuals within their
jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered
by private individuals.8'
Although this was not the first decision in relation to Article 3 of
the Convention where the Court, arguably, established the
responsibility of the state for the acts of private individuals.' it was
the first case where the Court was to decide on an alleged violation of
Article 3 in an entirely private context. The judgment indicated both
that the state was responsible for the ill-treatment inflicted by the
private individuals and that the acts of private individuals shall be
regarded, if those acts attain a required level of severity, as torture
and the other forms of ill-treatment covered by Article 3 of the
Convention.
There is yet another significant aspect of the Court's decision in
this case. This is one of the first cases where no distinction was made
among the categories of treatment covered by Article 3. The Court
simply stated that in the case of A. v. United Kingdom, there was a
violation of Article 3.8 Such an approach not only expresses a recent
tendency to not distinguish among the elements of the various forms
of ill-treatment, but also stresses that all forms of ill-treatment
prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention may be inflicted by the acts
of private citizens. This decision resolves the long-persisting dilemma
of whether some forms of ill-treatment, specifically torture, might
exist where the acts of private individuals are at issue. It is not
insignificant that the decision in the case of A. v. United Kingdom was
reached unanimously. This fact gives the judgment strong credibility
87. Id. at para. 22.
88. See, e.g., H. L. R. v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 11/1996/630/813, Apr. 22,1997.
The Court reasoned that
[b]y virtue of the positive obligations incumbent on the States and the
absolute character of the right concerned, Article 3 applied to inhuman and
degrading treatment resulting from the actions of private individuals. This is
present where a contracting State has, through its acts or passivity, failed to
comply with its duties under the Convention.
Id.
89. Although the Commission had labeled the treatment in question as degrading
treatment and punishment, the Court did not follow the Commission's statement in
this respect.
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and suggests that the opinions expressed therein would most likely be
followed in the future.
11.

Inhuman Treatment

As noted in the discussion of torture in Part II of this Article, the
Court defines inhuman treatment as that which deliberately causes
severe mental or physical suffering. The definition of inhuman
treatment encompasses the same elements as the definition of torture.
The difference between the two is only one of degree: torture
represents an aggravated form of inhuman treatment, involving more
serious suffering and greater cruelty2 0
In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Court's judgment
was that the practice of the five techniques that was applied to
suspected Irish Republican Army terrorists during interrogation by
British officials amounted to inhuman treatment within the meaning
of Article 3. As mentioned in Part II of this Article, the five
techniques consisted of wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise,
sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink.9' The Court
found that those techniques were applied in combination and caused
"if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental
suffering . . . and led to acute psychiatric disturbances during
interrogation." The Court found that the five techniques amounted
to inhuman treatment, without specifying what elements of the
treatment were considered crucial in reaching the decision.
In the following three cases, the Court found both inhuman and
degrading treatment, but did not distinguish among them as which
specific elements constituted inhuman treatment and which
3
constituted degrading treatment. First, in Tomasi v. France9
the
90. As to the practical consequences of deeming conduct to be torture as

opposed to inhuman treatment, some have observed that a stronger degree of
condemnation is associated with the term torture than with inhuman treatment.
Historically, that point has significance in that torture has longer been recognized as

one of the most serious crimes against humanity, grave crimes, or war crimes, and as
the most serious form of ill-treatment proscribed by international human rights
instruments. However, this distinction has been losing its significance recently as far

as the European human rights enforcement bodies are concerned. The European
Court of Human Rights has recently been inclined to announce a violation of Article
3 of the European Convention without labeling the treatment in question as torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
91. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 96, Jan. 18, 1978.

92. Id. at para. 167.
93. Tomasi v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 27/1991/279/350, June 25, 1992.
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applicant was held in police custody for two days while he "was
struck... by police-officers[,] .. .not allowed any rest[,] . .. left
without food[,] ... left naked in front of an open window for two to
three hours[,] ... then dressed and beaten up." 94 This treatment left
bruises on his chest, superficial scratches on his body, and a
hematoma on his head. The Court characterized this treatment as
inhuman and degrading. The applicant stated in his application that
the blows inflicted upon him "had not only caused him intense
physical and mental suffering; they had also aroused in him feelings of
fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating him and breaking
'
The Commission expressed the
his physical or moral resistance."95
view that "[a]lthough the injuries observed might appear to be
relatively slight, they nevertheless constituted outward signs of the
use of physical force on an individual deprived of his liberty and
therefore in a state of inferiority."96 The treatment, therefore, was
both inhuman and degrading.
Second, in the case of Ribitch v. Austria,97the applicant was held
in police custody for two to three days, where, while questioned by
police officers as a crime suspect, he was "grossly insulted and then
assaulted repeatedly .... He received punches to the head, kidneys
and right arm and kicks to the upper leg and kidneys. He was pulled
to the ground by the hair and his head was banged against the floor."'
This treatment caused him "bruises on his right arm and one thigh
and he suffered from a cervical syndrome, vomiting, diarrhea and a
violent headache." 99 The Court found that he had suffered inhuman
and degrading treatment, explaining that "in respect of a person
deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which has not
been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human
dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in
Article 3 of the Convention.""'
Third, the Commission found in Tekin v. Turkey"° ' that "it has
been established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was
kept in a cold and dark cell, blindfolded and treated in a way which
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at para 45.
Id. at para. 112.
Id. at para 113.
Ribitch v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 421199414891571, Nov. 21,1995.
Id. at para. 12.

99. Id.
100. Id. at para. 38.
101. Salih Tekin v. Turkey, No. 22496/93, Apr. 17, 1997 (Commission report).
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left wounds and bruises on his body in connection with his
interrogation."'" The Commission's view was that such treatment
amounted at least to inhuman and degrading treatment within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The Commission explicitly
stated that the treatment against the applicant was to be regarded as a
whole, without distinguishing between inhuman and degrading
elements.
Again, striking parallels may be drawn to the incidents of
domestic violence. For example, Shirley, a women interviewed
during the course of research on marital rape, reported that she was,
inter alia, forced by her husband "to sit in a chair for hours on end
while he watched her. If she looked at the clock, she got hit ....
This treatment may be compared to that part of the "five techniques"
described as "wall-standing."'"' 4
While wall-standing included
standing in an unpleasant position, Shirley had to sit on the edge of
the chair for hours, which undoubtedly was very unpleasant and even
painful after a long period of time. The discomfort of her position
was aggravated by the fact that her husband would watch her
continuously. The treatments in both cases did not include the
application of physical force and in both cases the abusers kept the
victims in a stress position for long periods of time, causing suffering
without leaving physical injuries.
Lenore Walker divides physical assaults against women within
the context of domestic violence into two major categories: minor
physical assaults and major physical assaults. According to Walker,
the former includes "a slap in the face, a smack on the rear end, a
pinch on the cheek or arm, a playful punch and hair pulling."'' 5 These
incidents were considered battering only if they occurred regularly.
Within the category of major physical assaults, Walker included
slaps and punching all over the body, choking to the point of
consciousness loss; pushing and throwing across a room, down the
stairs, or against objects; severe shaking; arms twisted or broken;
burns from irons, cigarettes, and scalding liquids; injuries from
thrown objects; forced shaving of pubic hair; forced violent sexual
acts; stabbing and mutilation with a variety of objects, including

102. Id. at para. 214.
103. Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 38, at 19.
104. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 96, Jan. 18, 1978.
105. WALKER, supra note 29, at 79.
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knives and hatchets; and gunshot wounds.'"
Such treatment has resulted in more or less severe consequences,
such as
broken necks and backs[,] . . . [the] loss of a kidney and severe
injury to [the] second kidney[,] ... serious internal bleeding and
bruises, swollen eyes and noses, [and] lost teeth.... Surgery was
required in a large number of cases. Women were often knocked
unconscious by the blows. Many others were choked nearly
unconscious."O
Subsumption of the above described examples of incidents of
domestic violence under the forms of ill-treatment prohibited by
Article 3 of the Convention would depend on the level of severity
reached in each particular case. This level is to be judged according
to all the relevant circumstances of the case. While, arguably, some of
the incidents of domestic violence may well satisfy the level of
severity regarding physical and psychological suffering combined with
the duration necessary for treatment to amount to torture, most of
them would undoubtedly amount to the level of inhuman treatment
or inhuman and degrading treatment combined.

IV. Degrading Treatment
In the majority of its decisions on the violation of Article 3 of the
Convention, the Court and the Commission have found that the
106. Id. at 79.
107. Id. at 79-80. As Rhonda Copelon notes,
A study of 100 battered women in the United States reported:
All had received the minimum of bruises, but 44 had also received
lacerations of which 17 were due to attack with a sharp instrument such
as a bottle, knife or razor. Twenty-six had received fractures of nose,
teeth or ribs and eight had fractures of other bones, ranging from fingers
and arms to jaw and skull. Two had their jaws dislocated and two others
had similar injuries to the shoulder. There was evidence of retinal
damage in two women and one had epilepsy as a result of her injuries.
In 19 cases there were allegations that strangulation attempts had been
made. Bums and scalds occurred in eleven and bites in seven cases. All
the women had been attacked with the minimum of a clenched fist, but
59 claimed that kicking was a regular feature. In 42 cases a weapon was
used, usually the first available object, but in fifteen cases this was the
same object each time, eight being a belt with a buckle.
Copelon, supra note 9, at 311 n.56 (quoting J. J. Gayford, Battered Wives, 15 MED.
SCI. & L. 237, 238 (1975), cited in U.N. CTR. FOR SOCIAL DEV. & HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY, U.N. Doe. ST/CSDHA/2,
U.N. Sales No. E.89.IV.5 (1989)).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 23:217

treatment in question represented both inhuman and degrading
treatment, without distinguishing between the two as to what
elements were seen as constituting inhuman treatment and what
elements as constituting degrading treatment. However, with respect
to the label degrading treatment, in its judgment in the case of Ireland
v. United Kingdom, the Court, when referring to the practice of the
five techniques, held that
the techniques were also degrading since they were such as to
arouse in their victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority
capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking
their physical or moral resistance.'08
0 the Commission
In the case of Raninen v. Finland,"
found a
breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant had been
handcuffed while being transferred from the Court, where he was
sentenced to imprisonment as a conscientious objector, to the County
Prison. The handcuffing had occurred in a courtyard in the presence
of the applicant's support group and had lasted for about two hours
during the transportation to the prison. The Commission expressed
the view that this treatment amounted to degrading treatment within
the meaning of Article 3. As a rationale, the Commission stated that
[a] treatment may also be said to be degrading if it grossly
humiliates a person in front of others or drives him to act against
his will or conscience ....
A measure which does not involve
physical ill-treatment but lowers a person in rank, position,
reputation or character may also constitute degrading treatment,
but again provided it attains a minimum level of severity, thereby
interfering with human dignity.... [But] the absence of publicity
does not necessarily prevent the treatment from attaining the
proscribed level of severity. It may suffice that the victim is
humiliated in his own eyes ....
It is essential whether or not the
treatment in question denotes contempt or lack of respect for the
personality of the person subjected to it and whether it was
designed to humiliate or debase him instead of, or in addition to,
achieving other aims." 0
These factors are in addition to the elements noted by the Court in
Ireland v. United Kingdom.

108. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 167, Jan. 18, 1978.
109. Raninen v. Finland, No. 20972/92, Oct. 24, 1996 (Commission report).
110. Id. at paras. 50-52.
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From various cases x. in which the Court and the Commission
have deemed a treatment to be a degrading treatment within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, two types of effects can be
discerned to qualify a treatment as degrading. One such set of effects
includes the arousal of feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority in the
victim. Those feelings have to reach such an extent that they may
humiliate or debase the victim and break the victim's physical or
moral resistance. The other set of effects includes the gross
humiliation of a victim in front of others or in the victim's own eyes.
For both the first and the second group of effects, it is required that
the treatment in question denote contempt or a lack of respect for the
victim and that it be designed to humiliate or debase the victim.
In the domestic violence context, marital rape certainly has the
most degrading effect. Describing the impact of marital rape, David
Finkelhor and Kersti Yllo state, "An intense feeling of humiliation
was another major response. 112 (This followed the first response of
hatred and fury.) "For many women this [humiliation] took the form
of feeling defiled or unclean. A quarter of our interviewees reported
that they felt dirty and degraded in the aftermath of rape.... The
same authors also report that "[r]esearch on rape victims has shown
that they overwhelmingly experience fear, pain, humiliation, and
disgust. ' .. Feelings of fear and terror persist for years even after the
women have left their abusive relationships. A long-lasting and
severe negative effect of marital rape is reflected in the women's low
self-esteem.'
Indeed, one of the men who battered and raped his
wife claimed that "he had no interest in inflicting physical pain on his
wife but wanted, instead, to dominate and degrade her. 11 6 Such
claims explicitly show that marital rape is often deliberately designed
to humiliate or debase. Victims of marital rape feel degraded and
humiliated in their own eyes and develope a negative image of
themselves, which, in the views of the European Court and
Commission, suffices to establish degrading treatment.
111. See, e.g., East African Asians v. United Kingdom, Eur. Comm'n of Hum.
Rts., Dec. 14, 1973, paras. 195, 208; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 25,
1978, paras. 30-35; Albert & Le Compte v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 10, 1983,
para. 22; Abdulazis, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., May

28, 1985, para. 91.
112.
113.
114.
115.

FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 38, at 118-19.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 117.
See id. at 130-36.

116.

RUSSELL,

supra note 8, at 134.
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Marital rape is not the only act in the repertoire of domestic
violence that includes elements of degrading treatment. Incidents of
actual physical violence or threats of physical violence, both of which
almost always are accompanied by verbal abuse that includes
insulting remarks about a woman's body, personality, abilities or
behavior, are meant to humiliate or debase women and show a
significant lack of respect for them. It seems that most episodes of
domestic violence, taken as a whole, encompass the elements of
either inhuman and degrading treatment or, in the most severe cases,
torture and degrading treatment.
V. Degrading Punishment
The element necessary for treatment to fall under the category of
degrading punishment is that its purpose has to be to punish. Violent
acts against women, perpetrated by their male partners, are
sometimes motivated by the purpose of punishment. Some men
inflict violence on their female partners partly because they feel that
the victim deserves to be punished for some reason."7 Sometimes it
would be to make her obey him, to correct her,"' or to discipline her.
All of these explanations have one thing in common: the view
that the woman is the one to be blamed. The concept of blame is
closely connected with the concept of punishment. Punishment is
usually "justified" by an act of the person against whom it is inflicted;
the act was wrong and therefore the person who is punished is
blameworthy. It is not only the batterer who feels justified in his right
to punish his female partner: "The batterer feels justified in his
violent behavior because society says it is truly the woman's fault, not
his. It perpetuates his notion that he should beat her because she did
something to make him angry.""' 9 Lenore Walker gives some of the
reasons behind the myth that women need to be punished by their
husbands:
The myth that battered women provoke their beatings by pushing

their men beyond the breaking point is a popular one. Everyone
can recount a story where a woman seemed to deserve what she
117. Russell cites the words of a battered woman about her husband's behavior:
"He'd come home and knock me in the head saying: 'Here's for what you did today.
If you didn't do it today, you'll do it tomorrow."' Id. at 230.
118. Another husband would beat his wife saying, "'You've got to learn to
behave!"' Id. at 150.
119. WALKER, supra note 29, at 15.
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got: she was too bossy, too insulting, too sloppy, too uppity, too
angry, too obnoxious, too provocative, or too something else. In a
culture where everyone takes sides between winners and losers,
women who continuously get beaten are thought to deserve it. It is
assumed that if only they would change their behavior, the batterer
could regain his self-control. The stories of the women in this study
indicate that batterers lose self-control because of their own

internal reasons, not because of what the women did or did
not...."

Concerning the element of degradation, much of what has been
discussed in Part IV on degrading treatment is applicable here. In
most cases, the Court and the Commission have found both
degrading treatment and punishment, regarding the treatment in
question as a whole.
As in all other cases where a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention has been involved, the Court and the Commission have
continuously stressed the relative nature of the assessment of the
severity of the treatment questioned in each case by taking into
consideration all of the circumstances of the case. For example, in the
case of Warwick v. United Kingdom, the Commission found that the
treatment at issue, which consisted of administering one stroke of a
cane to the hand of a sixteen year-old girl by a man, in the presence of
another man, which left a physical injury the effects of which were
visible for over a week, attained the level of severity necessary to
amount to degrading punishment prohibited by Article 3 of the
Convention. 2' By contrast, in the case of Costello-Roberts v. United
Kingdom, the Court found that the applicant had been "slippered
three times on his buttocks through his shorts with a rubber-soled
gym shoe"' 2 and that this had not produced any severe or long-lasting
effects as a result. The treatment thus did not reach the minimum
threshold of severity required.' 2 In the case of A. v. United Kingdom,
the applicant, a nine year-old boy, was over a period of approximately
one week caned by his stepfather, over the clothes, not less than six
times. The Court stated only that the applicant had been beaten
forcefully with a cane on more than one occasion, and that this kind
120. Id.
121. Warvick v. United Kingdom, No. D. R. 60, July 18, 1996, para. 5
(Commission report).
122. Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R, No. 89/1991/341/414,
para. 3, Feb. 23, 1993.
123. Id. at para. 32.
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of treatment reaches the level of severity prohibited by Article 3,24
whereas the Commission labeled it degrading treatment and
punishment.
Certain specific circumstances in the domestic violence context
may add to the degrading character of abusive treatment. One
example would be any punishment that is arbitrarily applied to an
adult. Also, men are usually physically stronger than women, so that
women are unable to defend themselves, thus adding to their
degradation. Women who are victims of domestic violence are often
regarded as deserving it for their perceived shortcomings as wives or
partners-this adds to their humiliation. Finally, social stigma and
shame attach to the victims, thus aggravating the humiliating nature
of their treatment.
VI. Inhuman Punishment
As for the category of inhuman punishment, there appear to be
no reported cases decided either by the Court or the Commission
where a breach of Article 3 of the Convention has been established
on this basis. Therefore, a comparison between the jurisprudence of
the European human rights enforcement bodies and the incidents of
domestic violence on this matter cannot be made.
VII. Interpretation of the Convention
The text of the European Convention on Human Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms does not differ significantly from the texts of
other international or regional human rights instruments that protect
mainly what are usually labeled as first generation rights: civil and
political rights.'25 However, due to the interpretation of the
Convention by the European human rights enforcement bodies, the
European Convention has been used in a way that has broadened the
scope of certain rights and strengthened the responsibility of the
states to uphold them. This is certainly the case with respect to
Article 3 of the Convention. The Court and the Commission have
reduced the requirements for torture by not including into its
definition the element of the involvement of the state officials and,
124. A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., judgment of 23 Sept. 1998, at para. 21.
125. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A
(xxi), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996), 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series
No. 36, at 1, OEA/ser. L./V/11, 23 doc. Rev. 2.
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arguably, the element of specified purposes. Such an approach is
crucial to the argument that European human rights bodies are very
close to accepting certain cases of domestic violence as a breach of
Article 3. Therefore, further observations on the interpretation of the
Convention are necessary.
Already in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judge
Evrigenis, referring to the interpretation of the Convention, stated
that the Convention has to be interpreted by taking the current
situation as well as history into consideration."6 Such an approach
strongly favors seeing cases of domestic violence as possible
violations of Article 3.
Judge Evrigenis's view of how the Convention ought to be
interpreted differs significantly from the approach of Judge Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, who argues as follows:
It would be reasonable to suppose that, at the date when the
Convention was framed, during the aftermath of war and atrocity, it
would have been the severer forms of ill-treatment that the Parties
would have had in mind, those that ... amount recognizably to
torture or inhuman treatment, etc. These were, at the time, well
known, within contemporary experience, easily discerned. To go
further would have necessitated much more careful and detailed
consideration-and drafting.' 27
This view holds that the forms of ill-treatment covered by Article 3
are those that a majority of people would immediately recognize as
such, or, in other words, those that are so manifestly wrong that we
need not think about them. Furthermore, Judge Fitzmaurice seemed
to suggest that the Convention is to be interpreted according to the
standards of the time when it was adopted.
History shows that the Court has undertaken a different
approach. The Court has often referred to the Convention as a living
instrument that has to follow the ever-developing and ever-improving
standards of the social judgments relevant to legal judgments in
Europe."
These developments include not only scientific or
126. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 124, para (a)(I), Jan.
18,1978.
127. Id. at para. 17 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
128. There are many problems with this view-it is vague and it is disputable
whether a common European standard exists at all. The community that includes
countries such as Norway, Portugal, Cyprus and Bulgaria may encounter many
difficulties in an attempt to discern common standards for itself. For the purposes of
this Article, however, it is sufficient to note that the idea of a European standard has
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technical aspects of progress, but also changes in human conscience
about such issues as the treatment of children, the treatment of
psychiatric patients in hospitals, the conditions in prisons, as well as
wife abuse. On many of these issues, the Court has defended the
position that the Convention should be applied according to the
contemporary standards of living society, and not the time when it
was drafted. As far as Article 3 is concerned, such an attitude was
expressed in the cases involving corporal punishment of children,
where the Court stated explicitly that
[t]he Court must also recall that the Convention is a living
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but be
influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards
in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe
in this field.

29

The European human rights enforcement bodies have also
disagreed with Judge Fitzmaurice's opinion regarding what should be
seen as constituting ill treatment under Article 3. They are more
likely to defend the position of Judge O'Donoghue, expressed in his
dissenting opinion in Ireland v. United Kingdom. In that case, when
discussing whether the five techniques constituted torture, Judge
O'Donoghue stated, "One is not bound to regard torture as only
present in a mediaeval dungeon where the appliances of rack and
thumbscrew or similar devices were employed."'" This suggests that
times have changed and we are to interpret the scope and meaning of
the categories of treatment prohibited in Article 3 according to
present day standards.
Consequently, the Court has expanded the scope of Article 3 in
significant ways. This expansion has been connected mostly to
deportation cases, where the applicants were foreign nationals that
were under a deportation order from the state party to the
Convention.
Starting with the case of Soering v. United Kingdom, and
following in cases such as Chahal v. United Kingdom, Ahmed v.
Austria, and many others, the expansion of the scope of Article 3 has
gone in a few directions. The Court has stated that Article 3
consistently been used by the Court to introduce progressive ideas.
129. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 5856/72, Apr. 25, 1978.
130. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 128, Jan. 18, 1978
(O'Donoghue, J., dissenting).
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encompasses all persons within the jurisdiction of the state, despite
the fact that the applicants may be found to be in the territory of the
state party illegally. Another direction of expansion has been the
holding that there is a violation of Article 3 even when there is only a
threat of ill treatment in a particular situation, and when such a threat
is coming from a country that is not a party to the Convention. The
state party would be held responsible because with its act of
deportation if it would have exposed the applicant to a real and
substantial risk of being subjected to one of the prohibited
treatments.
While in the type of case just mentioned the threat was at least
coming from the state authorities of another country, in the case of H.
R. L. v. France,the Court went a step further. In this case, the threat
of prohibited ill-treatment originated from the acts of private
individuals-drug dealers in Columbia. Although the Court found no
violation of Article 3 on the ground that there was not enough
evidence of the treatment as being real and substantial, it still held
that there would be no obstacle to imposing state responsibility in
cases where the acts of private individuals were in question.
In D. v United Kingdom, 131 the ill treatment at issue consisted of
the fact that the applicant who suffered from AIDS would receive a
lower quality of medical treatment for his disease in St. Kitts, to
whence he was to be deported because of a drug smuggling
conviction, than in the United Kingdom. In this case, it is hard to
identify the source of the risk of, or the responsibility either of
another state or private individuals for, the lack of medical treatment
of persons with AIDS on St. Kitts. The Court found a violation of
Article 3 on the part of the United Kingdom, however, thus
establishing the view that the source of the risk, or the source of the
acts that represent the violation of protected rights, are irrelevant.
The only relevant element is that there is some ground for state
responsibility.
In all of these cases, the Court has based its opinion on the
absolute character of Article 3. Not only are the states unable to
derogate from, limit, or put reservations on the protections of Article
3, but they might even be held responsible for violations that occur
outside of their territories and where the source of the violation was
completely unrelated to the authorities of the state party to the
Convention. Such developments of the scope of Article 3 are
131. D. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 1461199617671964, May 2 1997.
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significant because they show that there is a better likelihood that the
absolute character of Article 3 would encompass the protection of
women in domestic violence cases.
VIII. Conclusion
In this Article, two sets of stories have been compared: cases that
represent torture and other forms of ill-treatment, seen through the
lenses of the European human rights enforcement bodies, and the
cases of a great number of women who have been exposed daily to
the atrocities of domestic violence. Some centuries ago, the word
torture exclusively referred to the type of treatment applied to a
person indicted for a crime for the purpose of obtaining his or her
confession. But times have changed. In the last century, the
atrocities committed against individuals and peoples in many wars, as
well as during periods of "peace," have impeded the development of
human rights and strongly influenced the notion of the legal standards
to be applied in cases involving various forms of ill-treatment.
European human rights bodies have shown a great deal of compliance
with the ideas that support the view that ill-treatment is not to be
tolerated by the law, no matter where it occurs. In a period of some
thirty years, these bodies have significantly broadened the scope of
the application of Article 3 of the European Convention.
It is uncertain what will be seen by the Court as insufficient
protection. On the one hand, there are positive obligations of the
states to secure the rights stemming from the Convention to
everyone. On the other hand, the margin of appreciation doctrine
might give wide discretion to the states as to what measures and tools
are the most appropriate regarding the various rights of the
Convention.'32
If cases of domestic violence were to be regarded as violations of
the rights stemming from the Convention, it would be an important
milestone for women. The Court might order changes in domestic
legislation as well as introduce positive measures for the protection of
women against violence in their homes. Secondarily, the decisions of
the European Court would probably be regarded as illustrating a
132. In the case of Stabbing v. United Kingdom, the Court found that there was no
violation of Article 3 of the Convention where the victim was not able to sue for civil
damages an adoptive father who allegedly molested the victim during several years of
her childhood because the limitation period was five years after the victim's
eighteenth birthday. The Court expressed the opinion that it was sufficient that the
father could have been criminally prosecuted.
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significant change in the attitudes toward women and the
responsibility for violence inflicted against them. Finally, women
would be able to seek damages for the sufferings they have
undergone and to reinforce the rights that have been denied them in
their domestic legal systems."'
The progressive direction of the Court's jurisprudence has been
expressed in various areas of life. In cases such as Marckx v.
3
1 the Court protected the rights of
Belgium" and Johnston v. Ireland,1
illegitimate children. In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,36 the Court
expressed the view that the criminalization of certain homosexual
activities among consenting adults in Ireland is an infringement of the
right to privacy. In B. v. France, 7 it was decided that the inability of
a transsexual to change names according to the new gender following
the operation is a violation of the right to private life. In Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom,"' the Court fiercely protected the freedom
of expression and other rights.
The broad interpretation of the scope and purpose of Article 3 of
the Convention, as well as the progressive tendencies of many of the
Court's judgments, some of which are mentioned above, support the
conclusion that the Court would show little hesitation in finding a
case of significant violence against a woman in the private sphere to
be a violation of Article 3. One must not forget, however, that the
Court is not bound by its previous decisions. Therefore, the final
conclusion cannot be discerned from the previous judgments of the
Court with absolute certainty. Still, the Court has shown a tendency
to repeat its previous decisions in similar matters.
There are certain other elements that may influence the Court's
decision. One of these is the growing awareness of the phenomenon
of violence against women as a widespread cause of gender inequality
as well as women's health problems. There is also a growing
understanding of domestic violence as a public issue and of the state's
responsibility for the non-prosecution of perpetrators. There is little
doubt that such developments would significantly influence the future
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Also, one of
133. The reason for this is that the protection of the European human rights

bodies may be sought only after all domestic remedies are exhausted.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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the expressed policies of the Council of Europe is the achievement of
equal gender representation by the European Court of Human
Rights. It might be expected that a greater number of women judges
would increase sensibility towards women's issues.
This Article began by asking how likely it would be for the Court
to accept an allegation that violence that occurred in the private
sphere against a woman by her male partner as a violation of Article
3 of the Convention. The arguments presented, taken together,
strongly support the view that the answer to the question is much
closer to the positive protection of women than not.

